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Abstract
Studies investigating fertility decline in developing countries often adopt measures of determinants of fertility 
behavior developed based on observations from developed countries, without adapting them to the realities of 
the study setting. As a result, their findings are usually invalid, anomalous or statistically non-significant. This 
commentary draws on the research article by Moeeni and colleagues, as an exemplary work which has not adapted 
measures of two key economic determinants of fertility behavior, namely gender inequality and opportunity costs of 
childbearing, to the realities of Iran’s economy. Measurement adaptations that can improve the study are discussed.
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Low fertility and shift in population policy in Iran
Fertility levels have fallen drastically to below replacement 
level (below two children per woman required to maintain 
the population) in most Western industrialized countries. 
A growing number of developing countries, including Iran, 
have also mirrored this trend (1). Over the past decade, the 
fertility rate has remained low in Iran. A below replacement 
total fertility rate (the average number of children per 
woman), observed initially in 2000 at 1.98 children per 
woman in Iran’s population (2), has been declining since 
then. The current national total fertility rate is estimated at 
1.6 children per woman, based on 2011 household census 
data (3). In fact, six provinces have a rate under 1.5 children 
with the rates for twenty out of thirty one provinces less than 
two children. 
The persistent low fertility has become an increasing concern 
for countries with low fertility, as it leads to rapidly ageing 
populations, a declining labor force, and smaller overall 
population size. As a result, increasing attention is being paid 
to policies to reduce the social and economic burdens of the 
negative consequences of low fertility. One policy strategy 
is to focus on raising fertility rates so that a larger number 
of younger, productive members of the population would be 
available to balance the increasing numbers of older people 
and promote economic development. As a timely example, 
one can refer to the recent shift in Iran’s population policy 
toward a pronatalist population and family policy. The 
success of any policy attempts to raise fertility levels relies 
on improving the understanding of determinants of low 
fertility, and identifying subgroups of women with low and 
very low fertility levels. 
Iranian fertility studies: an appraisal  
A wide range of theoretical approaches have been developed 
to explain determinants of low fertility in Western 
industrialized countries [for a review, see (4,5)]. For example, 
they link low fertility to increasing opportunity costs 
of childbearing for women (6,7) and women’s financial 
independence (8), inequality in the household gender roles 
and decision-making (9), and the spread of individualism 
and emerging alternative forms of family formation (10,11). 
However, few Iranian fertility studies have systematically 
examined the determinants of low fertility as done in 
industrial societies. 
The recent Iranian fertility studies can be categorized into 
two general groups. A first group of studies, being largely 
descriptive and illustrative, exclusively narrate contextual 
socio-economic and political conditions that are assumed to 
be the causes of fertility decline and differentials in Iran (12–
14). Reviewing demographic and socio-economic trends, 
they attribute the rapid decline in fertility after the 1979 
Revolution in Iran to mainly structural and aggregate factors, 
such as the war-induced economic hardships, declining 
maternal and child mortality, family planning program 
and population policy, improvement in women’s literacy 
rate and other life standards, and the support of religious 
leaders. Due to the descriptive nature of these studies, they 
could not estimate and quantify the relative impact of these 
likely determinants of fertility. However, the second group 
of studies have attempted to compensate this shortcoming 
to some extent by analyzing the relative impact of structural 
and proximate determinants of fertility behavior and levels 
(2,15–18). For example, Erfani and McQuillan (2) found that 
61% of the reduction in the observed fertility rate in Iran was 
attributed to contraceptive use, 31% to the postponement of 
marriage among young population and other 8% to abortion 
and postpartum infecundability. Among socio-economic 
structural factors, influencing fertility behavior through 
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proximate determinates, women’s education had the greatest 
impact on postponing or stopping births in Iran (18–20). 
Yet, there is limited systematic knowledge on the role of 
‘economic’ factors influencing fertility behavior in Iran. 
As noted by scholars (21,22), this shortcoming is mostly 
due to conceptual and methodological difficulties and data 
limitation in measuring economic determinants of fertility. 
A recently published article, entitled “Analysis of economic 
determinants of fertility in Iran: a multilevel approach” by 
Moeeni and colleagues (23), is a new attempt at closing this 
gap in the Iranian literature. 
Applying a multi-level analytical strategy, Moeeni and 
colleagues (23) investigated the effect of selected economic 
factors, at the household and provincial levels, on the number 
of household’s living children. At the household level, they 
found negative relationship between household’s total and 
educational expenditures and the spouses’ literacy. At the 
provincial level, authors tried to examine the impact of 
gender inequality, as a proxy for spousal bargaining power, 
on the number of children. Authors adopted benchmarking 
tools, introduced by World Economic Forum, to choose 
female economic participation and opportunity, educational 
attainment, political empowerment, polygamy rate and 
unmet needs for family planning as indices of gender gap in 
Iran. In addition to the fact that the validity of gender gap as 
a proxy for spousal bargaining power remains questionable 
to the reader, authors were expected to explain the 
conceptual and methodological rationales behind choosing 
the indices of “gender gap”. The study’s multivariate results 
showed no significant effect of female economic and 
political participations and wage on the number of living 
children, despite the fact that these are three key economic 
determinants of fertility in this research article. Moreover, 
based on the observed negative effect of the polygamy rate, 
unmet needs for family planning and male-to-female ratios 
of highly educated workers (three almost non-economic 
factors), authors draw an inapt economic conclusion as “The 
lower the household’s wife’s gains bargaining power, the more 
is the number of her children” (p.141).  It is this finding that I 
wish to focus on in this commentary. 
A need to adapt measures of economic determinants of 
fertility to developing-country settings 
According to population economic theories, low fertility 
is largely a function of economic insecurity, increasing 
opportunity costs of childbearing for women (6,7), and 
increasing women’s financial independence (8) through 
improved education and greater work participation. The 
economic independence of women reduces the gains from 
marriage based on traditional gender division of labor in 
the family, where women engage mostly in childbearing and 
household works, and increases childbearing costs. This in 
turn limits women’s fertility level. 
Such economic theoretical explanations of low fertility have 
been largely developed based on observations of developed-
country settings, where the female employment rate is as 
high as (or close to) the male rate, hence the mother should 
spend a high time input to produce a child. Researchers 
applying such a theoretical explanation of low fertility to 
a context in developing countries should be aware of two 
important conceptual and methodological issues. First, in 
many developing countries, including Iran, a small portion 
of women are employed. In the case of Iran, for instance, 
the result of 2011 national census revealed that only 13% 
of women aged 15 to 64 (working-age population) were 
economically active in informal occupations and paid 
employment (24). Moreover, the conditions of employment 
are different from those assumed in the standard economic 
models discussed above. That is, a large portion of employed 
women in developing countries, including Iran, work in 
agricultural jobs in rural areas or informal occupations in 
urban areas, which are not usually competitors to women 
time for childbearing and rearing. The combination of 
childrearing and agricultural works or working in informal 
jobs is common in many developing countries, allowing 
child-rearing to be done alongside labor force participation. 
Second, women’s perception of ‘gender equality’ in the family 
in developing countries can be different from those assumed 
in the standard economic models. The indices of gender equity 
in a developed economy are largely materialistic, objective 
indicators, such as paid-income differences with spouse, 
hours of work, childcare costs, and employment in formal 
sectors, which cannot be automatically applied to agricultural 
or informal economy in developing-country settings. 
For example, in a context like Iran, where 30% of young 
adult women aged 20-34 have post-secondary education (24) 
and are largely unemployed due to the scarcity of overall job 
opportunities in the country, instead of focusing on women’s 
economic participation as a competitor to reproduction, it is 
more plausible to choose women’s ‘employment aspiration’ 
as a ‘perceived’ economic determinant of low fertility 
rather than women’s ‘employment’ and ‘income’. Evidence 
shows that a highly educated and unemployed bride is more 
likely to postpone childbearing and delay transition to the 
motherhood, with the aspiration of finding a job in the 
future (25,26). Finally, researchers conducting a research 
about developing countries should note that ‘gender 
equity’ is a context bonded concept, which is required to be 
measured by valid indicators reflecting true aspects of the 
concept in the study context. Therefore, we need to avoid 
blindly adopting pre-existing indices developed based on 
observations of developed countries, which often result 
in non-significant or anomalous research findings for a 
developing-country context. 
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